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At the turn of the millennium, the European Union deluded itself with a false sense of 
security. It had sought to build a ring of friends that were supposed to become prosperous 
and more democratic, and to filter migrants coming to Europe. By doing so, Europeans 
made a twin mistake: they believed that their neighbours would emulate their example, 
and they outsourced their migration and border policies. This, in turn, had two conse-
quences. 
First, Europeans played into the hands of authoritarian and murderous leaders who ex-
acted concessions in return for keeping migrants at bay. In the 2000s, for instance, Colonel 
Qaddafi obtained financial rewards, as well as international recognition. And the agree-
ment that the EU struck with Ankara on 18 March 2016 to dry up the Aegean and Balkan 
routes for smugglers and refugees depends on Turkey’s willingness to comply. Second, Eu-
ropeans ignored power politics. In designing the so-called ‘ring of friends’, the EU stum-
bled over what the Kremlin considered to be its sphere of influence. The Commission and 
the Council produced technical solutions, Association Agreements and Deep and Com-
prehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), for what actually was a political issue: competition 
over eastern Europe. 
A global strategy worthy of its name should start with promoting security on the Euro-
pean continent and in its surroundings. The European Union established itself as a small 
community which forged a new way of conducting international relations in Europe. It 
gradually – and sometimes haphazardly and reluctantly – expanded its model and eventu-
ally began to dominate the continent and influence its periphery. This has now changed. 
The current challenges – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, forays in NATO members’ airspace, 
the war in Syria, inroads into the EU through Gazprom, corruption and disinformation, 
the refugee crisis, the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to Libya, 
Mali and Europe – are the result of some of the failings of the EU.
PREDICT AND PREPARE 
First of all, the European Union, as a collective, has repeatedly proven to be unable to 
think ahead. The latest wave of refugees started to build up in 2011, when uprisings in 
the Arab world were crushed. Although EU agencies and institutions published figures, 
and NGOs offered solutions (such as the resettlement of refugees to undermine people 
trafficking and allow for vetting), little was done. National administrative budgets – of the 
German Federal Office for Migrants and Refugees, for instance – were cut, and capacities 
to register migrants did not expand, be it in Greece or Italy. And, since the European Court 
of Human Rights ruled in 2011 that Athens disregarded the rights of refugees, the latter 
could not be deported back to Greece if they had crossed that country to move illegally 
to another EU member state. All of these were indicators that the so-called refugee crisis 
was in the making, and yet the EU still did not anticipate the massive influx of migrants. 
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The crisis over Ukraine offers a similar account. Though the Kremlin imposed a massive 
embargo on Ukrainian goods as of the summer of 2013, and President Putin met four 
times with his Ukrainian counterpart in November, Europeans deluded themselves by 
firmly believing that Kiev would sign the DCFTA. No proposal was made to mitigate the 
consequences of the embargo – despite the fact that Brussels later increased the quota of 
Moldovan wine, which was also subjected to a Russian embargo for the same reasons. 
THINK AND ACT EUROPEAN 
Second, the decision-making process of the EU is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. 
The heads of state and government have abandoned the Monnet method for numerous 
reasons, primarily to protect their so-called sovereignty, and also, as German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel put it, to promote the speed and efficiency of decision-making by centralis-
ing decisions within the European Council. Whether this is successful is far from obvious. 
When asked why the EU could not foresee the refugee crisis, a minister and confidante 
of Chancellor Merkel retorted that he could not multitask. Overwhelmed by the series 
of crises, the European Council has become overstretched, and the specific issues it does 
not deal with, such as the Normandy negotiations, fall onto the shoulders of the Ger-
man Chancellor – who is even more overburdened herself. Instead of being facilitated, the 
decision-making process in the EU is blocked: European and national civil servants cannot 
take political decisions and rely upon technocratic approaches. The DCFTA with Ukraine 
is a very good example of this lack of political thinking.
Last, because of prevailing of national sovereignties, the EU is incapable of controlling 
its own borders. Frontex was created to mount limited operations in order to repel illegal 
migrants. The external borders of the EU were, and still are, controlled by the peripheral 
member states. This system is dysfunctional, too. 
The EU and its eastern neighbours share 4,000 miles of land borders, of which 1,400 are 
with Russia. 23 out of 28 member states have a coastline adding up to a little over 40,000 
miles of indentations, caps, bays, and islands, some of which are very close to the borders 
of Asia and Africa, where problems abound. Only a European border guard would have a 
chance to work properly, patrolling coasts and inspecting harbours where, according to 
intelligence sources, surveillance is far too limited. 
